In my dissertation I argue that it is not only permissible but sometimes epistemically and ethically required to defer to another’s moral testimony. Specifically, I focus on marginalized testifiers when they testify about the harms that they, themselves, have experienced as a member of a marginalized group. I contend that, under certain circumstances, people who are not members of the relevant identity group have a duty to defer to those who are, and act in accordance with their testimony.

Projects In Progress

  • “Experiential Deference: A Reason for Optimism About Moral Deference,” in which I argue that a certain kind of moral deference (where the testifier has both empirical and normatively-laden phenomenological information that the receiver lacks) avoids the traditional worries.
  • “Solidarity Over Charity: Mutual Aid as a Moral Alternative to Effective Altruism,” where I discuss the benefits of partial community-building compared with impartial, international aid.
  • “Why You Ought to Defer: Moral Deference and Marginalized Experience,” co-authored with Elizabeth Williams. In this paper we argue that non-group members ought to defer to in-group members when they testifier about the identity harms that they have personally experienced.
  • “An Epistemic Injustice Critique of Austin’s Ordinary Language Epistemology,” in which I provide a critique of ordinary language’s reliance on ubiquitous social prejudices and provide solutions for its remediation.